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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAINER F . HUCK, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Respondent, 
vs . Case No. 14581 
ROBERT T. HAYES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. : 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an act ion brought by Plaintiff to compel specific pe r -
formance by Defendant under the t e r m s of an Earnes t Money Receipt and 
Offer to P u r c h a s e , o r , in the a l te rna t ive , for general damages . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COU^T 
This case was t r i ed in the Third Judicial Dis t r ic t Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Maurice 
Harding, sitting without a jury. On February 11, 1976, the Court grante 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant for specific 
performance, loss of rents, credits , and attorney's fees (R-139,140). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the Supreme Court reverse the decision of the trial court 
by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case to the trial court for 
entry of judgment of dismissal in accordance with the prayer of Defendant 
Verified Answer to Amended Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. As of March, 1974, Defendant owned a Buyer's interest 
in a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of reaL property 
located at 1161 East Bueno Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibits 16-P 
and 18-P). 
2. In early 1974, Defendant sought to sell his interests in 
this property for the purpose of raising money to purchase a new personal 
residence. During this period of t ime, Defendant entered into a listing 
agreement with A & B Realty Company, a licensed real estate broker, for 
the purpose of selling the property at 1161 East Bueno Avenue. Defendant 
dealt with A & B Realty through Marcia C. Evans, Emily West, and Lynn 
Austin, agents, who were employed or engaged on behalf of A &c B Realty 
for the purpose of listing and selling the property for a commission. 
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3. On M a r c h 3 , 1974, the Defendant s igned an E a r n e s t Money 
Rece ip t and Offer to P u r c h a s e p r e p a r e d by M a r c i a C. E v a n s of A. & B 
R e a l t y (Exhibi t 3 - P ) . 
4 C o n t r a r y t o t he l anguage of the E a r n e s t Money Rece ip t 
a nd Offer to Pi i rcha se , the Defendant a g r e e d to a s s i g n to PI aiiiti ff on or 
be fo re M a r c h 8, 1974, a l l his i n t e r e s t in a Un i fo rm Rea l E s t a t e c o n t r a c t 
(Exhibi t l( i- i: "), of which Defenda lit: K va s the ! a st a s s i g n e e (Exhi bit i 8 P ; 
p a r a g r a p h 4 of P l a i n t i f f ' s A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t , R - 2 2 ) . 
5, At no t i m e on or p r i o r to .-.a., h 8, I 7 4 . w a s t h e r e a 
t e n d e r of the p u r c h a s e p r i c e m a d e by Pla in t i f f t o Defendant (R-132, p a r a g r a p h 
15; R - 1 3 ^ , p a r a g r a p h I 1 : Pago ?P8 l ines 2 5 - ? 9 , T r a n s c r i p t ~f P r o c e e d i n g s ) . 
the D e f e n d a n t ' s Attorn* \, K i d . d , .: -V P e r k i n s , CDUX Uit. ^'Kiintiif o ^^o.; 
t .^ i l i t dL''.' " - :• - ' : ' ' t S 
oi Richard W_ Parkin-*. V.r. < ^rkinn did (HI- »<: J/. --, Evans that: 
, . .1 indicated to her at that t ime that Mr , Hayes was 
very upset, that he had indicated that p r io r to her coming 
the re , that he considered them to be in default or breach 
of the agreement . We were giving them notice of that at 
that pa r t i cu la r t ime . She then indicated something about 
liens and encumbrances of r ecord . I indicated to her that 
I knew nothing about liens or encumbrances of record as 
of that tin •<.,,. hat if she des i red to go and look, into the 
matter and determine supposedly what it was all about 
and come back and sit down and negotiate further , p resen t 
another offer, that we would be glad to do that. She, at 
that t ime , left. (Page 204, lines 11-22, T ransc r ip t of 
Proceedings) . 
7. On Apri l 15, 1974, at the law offices of Richard W. Perki i 
Defendant's Attorney, a meeting was held between the Defendant; Richard 
P e r k i n s ; Lynn Austin, and Emily West, l is t ing agents for A & B Realty; 
Plaintiff; Craig S. Cook, Plaintiff 's Attorney; Marcia C. Evans , sell ing 
agent for A & B Realty; and Bill Fage rg ran , Broker for A & B Realty. 
There took place a d iscuss ion in reference to l i ens , encumbrances , taxes 
insurance and purchase p r i c e , with no money being tendered by Plaintiff 
to Defendant. 
8. On or about June 1, 1974, Plaintiff tendered to A & B 
Realty, the l ist ing and sell ing agents , a c a s h i e r ' s check in the amount 
of $5 ,038 .32 . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE UNDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE. 
It is the posit ion of Defendant-Appellant in this Appeal, a s it 
was during the t r i a l of this m a t t e r , that the p r i m a r y i ssue in this action 
is whether or not a pu rchase r of an in te res t in rea l p roper ty , through the 
avenue of purchasing an ass ignment of a buye r ' s in te res t in a Uniform 
Real Esta te Contract , can withhold tender of purchase pr ice until such 
t ime as the chain of title i s perfected to the p u r c h a s e r ' s sat isfaction, 
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while ignoring the agreed te rminat ion date of an Earnes t Money Receipt 
and Offer to P u r c h a s e . 
In the instant c a s e , as hereinafter set forth in Point I I , both 
pa r t i e s admit that their intent, i r r e spec t ive of t[he wri t ing of the Earnes t 
Money Receipt and Offer to P u r c h a s e , was to s^ll and to buy a buyer ' s 
in te res t in a Uniform Real Estate Contract . The pa r t i e s did originally 
designate March 8, 1974, a s the expirat ion date of said Earnes t Money 
Receipt and Offer to P u r c h a s e , and both pa r t i e s have testified that t ime 
was of the essence in the performance of that agreement . 
The Supreme Court of the State of iJtah has repeatedly dealt 
with the i ssue of the obligation of a vendor to provide marketable t i t le 
during the sale of a piece of p roper ty on a Uniform Real Estate Contract . 
The landmark case in this a r e a would appear to be the case of 
Woodard v. Allen, 1 U. 2d 220, 265 P . 2d 398 (1953), wherein the Court held 
that marketable ti t le could only be de termined as of the t ime the purchase r 
t enders that which under the contract would requi re vendor to t rans fe r the 
tit le which he agreed to convey. While Woodard v. Allen dealt with a factual 
situation wherein the vendor sought relief from a judgment by denying the 
plaintiff vendor relief under a wri t ten r ea l es ta te contract as opposed to a 
plaintiff vendee seeking to enforce the same as in the instant c a s e , the 
court in citing Woodard v. Allen has repeatedly held that in order to be 
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rel ieved from the obligation to make payment under the contract , the 
vendee must show that the re is no possibi l i ty that the vendor will ever 
be able to convey good t i t l e , Amer ican Savings and Loan Associat ion v. 
Blomquist , 24 U. 2d 35, 465 P . 2d 353 (1970). In the case of Corporatioi 
Nine v. Taylor , 30 U.2d 47, 513 P . 2d 417 (1973), which, as the instant 
ca se , was an action by the pu rchase r seeking specific performance of a 
r ea l es ta te contrac t , the court held: 
. . .The law does not requi re the vendor to have 
c l ea r and marketable ti t le at all t imes during the p e r -
formance of his cont rac t , and is not ordinar i ly so 
obliged until the t ime comes for him to pe r fo rm. The 
buyer should not be heard to complain unless it appears 
that it will be impossible or at leas t highly unlikely that 
the se l le r will be able to per form his contrac t when he i s 
called upon to do so, which we do not see as the situation 
he re . Complementing this is the fact that the buyer 
should not be heard to complain when it is his own 
default which is prevent ing fulfillment of the contract . 
See a l so Mar low Investment Corp. v. Radmall , 26 U. 2d 124, 485 P . 2d 14 
(1971), and Leavit t v. Blohm, 11 U. 2d 220, 357 P . 2d 190 (I960). 
The general rule in this a r e a as promulgated by the Supreme 
Court of the State of California would appear to be supportive of the posil 
taken by this Honorable Court . A holding which has been subsequently 
followed by the Supreme Court of California is that set forth in the case 
Anderson v. Wills on. 191 P a c . 1016, 1019 (Cal. 1920), wherein the Court 
s tated: 
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. . . I t is the settled rule in this state that the vendor 
need not have even an inchoate t i t le at the t ime of the 
contract ; that he may sell land to which he has no t i t le , 
and the contract will be valid and enforceable if, when 
the t ime for performance a r r i v e s , he is able to furnish 
the ti t le he contracted to convey. 
See a l so Central Mutual Insurance Company v. Schmidt, 313 P . 2d 132 
(Cal. 1957). 
In the instant c a se , at the t ime the Defendant listed the subject 
proper ty for sale with A & B Realty, he did provide to the agents of A & B 
Realty, Miss Austin and Miss West, a copy of &n Assignment of Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (18-P), which s t a t e s , in par t : 
Know all Men by These P r e s e n t s : That Reynold 
Nelson and Mary Jean Nelson, his y i f e , for value received, 
does hereby grant. . . t ransfer and set over unto Robert T . 
Hayes, a l l r ight , t i t l e , and in teres t in and to the Uniform 
Real Esta te Contract dated July 3 , 1964, made and executed 
by Stanley Katz and Emma Katz, his wife, as s e l l e r s , to 
Reynold Nelson and Mary Jean Nelson, his wife, as buyers , 
Marcia C. Evans testified that she did on or about March 7, 1974, 
receive a p re l iminary repor t on the subject p roper ty (Exhibit 4 - P ) , which 
repor t r e fe r s to a Deed of Trus t executed by Stknley Katz, dated 1964, as 
well as a Deed recorded June 29, 1967, signed by Stanley Katz. Had the 
Plaintiff, or his agents , taken the recording information set forth in the 
p re l iminary repor t and checked the r eco rds of the County Recorder for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, they would have discovered a Warranty 
Deed recorded June 29, 1967, from Stanley Katz, to Thomas H. Kirschbaum 
and Suzanne S. Kirschbaum, the pa r t i e s to whom payments were cur ren t ly 
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being made by the Defendant Hayes . The re fo re , the Plaintiff cannot 
complain that there was an apparent impossibi l i ty of the Defendant Hayes 
to convey marketable t i t le to the proper ty upon payment of the intended 
cont rac t , for it appears from the record and the Assignment of Uniform 
Real Esta te Contract supplied by Defendant Hayes to the Plaintiff 's agents 
that Mr . Katz did have good title to the proper ty at the t ime he entered 
into the subject Uniform Real Es ta te Contract and that he did subsequently 
convey his title to Mr . Ki rschbaum who is cur ren t ly the fee owner of the 
proper ty . In fact, the only defects in the t i t le to said proper ty was the 
existence of a federal tax l ien, which amount could have been offset from 
the tender of the purchase p r i c e , as well a s two deeds made without marit 
status being shown, one by Stanley Katz and one by Vern Romney. These 
defects a r e cer ta inly not sufficient to exhibit an impossibi l i ty a s would be 
required under the law set forth in Corporat ion Nine v. Tay lor , supra . 
Complementing this is the fact that the Plaintiff, himself, should not be 
heard to complain when it was his own fault that the Ea rnes t Money Receij 
and Offer to Purchase was not fulfilled on or before March 8, 1974, due tc 
the fact that he chose to withhold tender of the purchase pr ice until such 
t ime as he and his agents were able to perfect the documentation within th 
chain of t i t le to their own complete sat isfaction. 
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In the case of F i sche r v. Johnson, 523 P . 2d 45 (Utah 1974), 
this Honorable Court held that the prospect ive pu rchase r s were not entitled 
to specific performance of an Earnes t Money Agreement executed in ant i -
cipation of enter ing into a final contract of purchase of a r e s t au ran t , when 
the pu rchase r s had failed to discharge the i r own duty of at tempting with 
reasonable diligence and faith to do what the agreement required of them, 
including a tender of $3 ,000 .00 . This Court said: 
Never the less , we cannot see there in any basis 
upon which it could reasonably be concluded that the 
plaintiffs d ischarged the duty which the law imposes 
upon them of at tempting with reasonable diligence and 
good faith to do what the agreement required of them. 
They did not fulfill that obligation by simply serving the 
notice of will ingness to go forward, and yet failing to 
tender the requi red $3 ,000.00 payment. 
This finding was made , even though n . . . t h e r e was undoubtedly 
a bas i s in the evidence to justify a conclusion that the actions of the defendants 
(vendors) crea ted some degree of difficulty or inconvenience for the plain-
tiffs (purchasers ) . M 
This Court has held in a number of t a s e s that in order to c la im 
specific pe r fo rmance , a party must ei ther pe r fo rm or tender performance 
in accordance with the covenants in his cont rac t . F i sche r v. Johnson, supra . 
See a l so , Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P . 2d 896 (Utah 1974); Sieverts v. White, 
2 U. 2d 351, 273 P . 2d 974; Coombs v. Ouzouniafl, 24 U. 2d 39, 465 P . 2d 356 
(1970). 
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POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THOSE FINDINGS OF FACT SET FORTH 
BELOW FOR THE REASON THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT 
TRIAL SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE SAME. 
1. The Fifth Finding of Fact was entered as follows: 
Utilizing the information obtained in the multiple 
l ist ing service of the Salt Lake Board of Rea l to rs , 
Plaintiff informed M r s . Evans of the t e r m s and condi-
tions upon which he was willing to purchase the Bueno 
proper ty . Plaintiff offered to pay $10, 600. 00 total 
purchase pr ice which consisted of $100. 00 earnes t 
money, approximately $5, 500. 00 on del ivery of a deed 
or final contract of sa le , and to a s sume the p r io r 
obligation ( termed as a mortgage) of approximately 
$5, 000. 00, with monthly payments of $75. 00 to include 
taxes and insurance . Other t e r m s and conditions were 
included by Plaintiff which a re evidenced by the ea rnes t 
money agreement . Plaintiff specifically requested that 
M r s . Evans wri te in the date of March 8, 1974, as the 
proposed closing date of the sa le . 
No test imony or other evidence was produced at the t ime of 
t r i a l that would support the date of March 8, 1974, as being a proposed 
closing date , but was , in fact, as evidenced by the Earnes t Money Agree 
ment (Exhibit 3 -P ) , specifically and without qualification, set forth as th 
date of te rminat ion of the said Earnes t Money Receipt and Offer to Purcl: 
2. 1 he Tenth Finding of Fact was entered a s follows: 
This agreement was valid and binding upon the pa r t i e s 
and was not ambiguous. 
This finding was nei ther supported by the evidence nor could 
it possibly r ep re sen t the intent of the p a r t i e s . The Ea rnes t Money Rece 
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and Offer to Purchase is couched in t e r m s of a cash purchase , assumption 
of niortgage and t r ans fe r of good and marketable t i t le . Plaintiff, however, 
seeks to compel Defendant 's performance undej: the t e r m s of a contract 
which he c la ims is valid and binding upon the par t i es and not ambiguous; 
yet, said contract , the Earnes t Money Receipt ptnd Offer to Purchase 
(Exhibit 3 -P) , makes no reference to the agreement for the purchase by 
Plaintiff of an in te res t in a Uniform Real Estate Contract of which the 
Defendant was the last ass ignee as alleged in pa ragraph 4 of Plaintiff 's 
Amended Complaint (R-22). This pa ragraph 4 s tates as follows: 
That Defendant agreed to ass ign to Plaintiff all right, 
t i t le , and in teres t in a Uniform Real Esta te Contract 
of which Defendant was the last ass ignee and Plaintiff 
did agree to pay to Defendant the sum of approximately 
$5, 000.00 and to a s sume the payments of the Uniform 
Real Esta te Contract . 
In addition to this admiss ion of the Plaintiff in his Amended 
Complaint, there was never a question that the pefendant had anything other 
than an in te res t in a Uniform Real Esta te Contract to sel l . Under c r o s s 
examination, the uncontroverted test imony of Defendant as set forth on 
pages 179 and 180 of the T ransc r ip t of Proceedings shows that at the t ime 
he listed the subject proper ty in his meeting witjh Miss West and M r s . 
Austin, agents of the listing and selling broker , he was very specific and 
c l ea r in his explanation of what he actually own^d and what he intended to 
se l l . This tes t imony is a s follows: 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHWOBE: 
Q. Mr. Hayes, Mr . Cook asked you about your f i rs t meetinj 
with rea l es ta te agents , Miss West and M r s . Austin, I 
bel ieve. 
A. Yes . 
Q. I will show you a document marked Plaintiff 's Exhibit 18, 
entitled ass ignment of rea l es ta te contract . Did you have 
the original of that document in your possess ion at that 
t ime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you show it to them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you tel l them, about it? 
A. I told them this is exactly what I had on the proper ty . 
I was very , very careful about th i s . I didn't want to 
make any mi s t akes , any misunders tanding of th i s , 
that they knew exactly what I had to convey. 
Q. And when you talked to M r s . Evans on the 2nd and 
the 3rd, did you show her the original of that document? 
A. Yes . I was running up and down the s t a i r s getting them 
out of my f i les , the ass ignment of contrac t , and I showe 
it to he r . She knew what was in i t . I told he r - - l a i d out 
the whole thing in front of her . 
Q. And what did she tel l you at that t ime? 
A. That there would be no prob lem, that they would be 
able to close the thing out in that March the 8th. 
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Defendant's position based upon the test imony of both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant as well as the pleadings of both par t ies is 
that there was an agreement for the purchase a^id sale of an in teres t in 
a Uniform Real Esta te Contract . While the Eajrnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase is cer tainly not c lear and unambiguous on i ts face, it 
is the contention of the Defendant-Appellant tha}: the agreement which is 
par t ia l ly included within the Earnes t Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
was intended to be performed on or before the $th day of March , 1974, and 
that PLaintiff had no right , under the laws of the State of Utah, as herein-
before d iscussed in Point I, to withhold or to refra in from tendering the 
purchase price money owed until such t ime as a| chain of title could be 
perfected to Plaintiff 's complete satisfaction. 
3. The Four teenth Finding of Fact} was entered as follows: 
On March 7, 1974, M r s . Evans advised Defendant of 
these ti t le p rob lems . Defendant instructed M r s . Evans to 
c lea r them as soon as possible so that a closing could be 
accomplished. She agreed and contacted the Plaintiff and 
informed him of these p rob lems . Plaintiff concurred that 
she should at tempt to c lear these p rob lems as soon as 
poss ib le . 
This Finding was not supported by the evidence. The Defendant 
denied he had such a conversat ion by telephone <br otherwise with M r s . Evans , 
the agent of A & B Realty (Line 25, Page 182, to Line 3, Page 183, T r a n s -
cr ipt of Proceed ings) . M r s . Evans , however, testified that upon being 
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informed of the deficiencies on or about March 7, Mr . Hayes said, 
11
 Just to go ahead and get it done as quickly as poss ib le" (Lines 2 - 3 , 
Page 90, T ransc r ip t of Proceedings) . M r s . Evans1 own tes t imony 
shows that Defendant Hayes did not ins t ruct her to c lear them up so 
that a closing could be held on this specific m a t t e r , and it does not 
necessa r i ly follow that if the Court believed the test imony most favor-
able to Plaintiff from the s ta tement , " Jus t go ahead and get it done a s 
quickly as poss ib le" , the s tatement was intended to waive the specific 
requi rement of the agreement to per form on the Earnes t Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase which te rmina ted if not closed on or before March 
1974. 
4. The Sixteenth Finding of Fact was entered as follows: 
Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to per form his 
par t of the ea rnes t money agreement and acted in good 
faith in at tempting to close the t ransac t ion at ail t i m e s . 
This Finding is improper for one reason that as opposed to 
stat ing a fact, it s ta tes a conclusion of law. However, even taken on its 
face as a conclusion of law, it is improper and cont ra ry to the evidence 
and the tes t imony of the pa r t i e s as set forth in pa rag raphs 11 and 12 of 
the Cor rec ted Conclusions of Law (R-136). 
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5. The Seventeenth Finding of Fact was entered as follows: 
On March 25, 1974, M r s . Evaiis conferred with defendant 
and his a t torney, Mr. P e r k i n s . At no time during said con-
ference was plaintiff or his agent given notice of defendant 's 
intent to abandon, waive, or resc ind the earnes t money a g r e e -
ment. 
The evidence does not support this Finding for the reason that 
the only test imony wherein default and re sc i s s ion a re mentioned is that of 
Mr . P e r k i n s , (Pages 203 and 204, T r a n s c r i p t c|f Proceedings) , as follows: 
Q. Calling your attention to March 25, 1974, did you, on that 
day, have occasion to meet witty Mr . Hayes and M r s . Evans 
regard ing this piece of proper ty? 
A. I did. 
Q. Would you relate the names of the people that were present? 
A. Mr. Hayes, myself, and M r s . Evans . 
Q. And would you descr ibe that meet ing to the best of your 
recollection? 
A. As I reca l l the meet ing was scheduled for the morning. 
Mr. Hayes came to my office ahead of t ime . We sat down 
and conversed about the m a t t e r . Again, I was able to look 
at the Earnes t Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase for the 
f i rs t t ime . 
We discussed that briefly and some of the problems involved. 
Shortly after that t ime M r s . Evans came . We waited for a 
period of t ime as it was represen ted that Mr . Huck would be 
t h e r e . He did not show up. 
I went back to my office and worked on other ma t t e r s for 
approximately 45 minutes . I cai^ie back out into the waiting 
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room where Mr. Hayes was sit t ing and a lso M r s . 
Evans. I says , "Bob", I says , "I 've got other 
commitments and things to do. Are we going to 
have a closing? What 's going on? M 
M r s . Evans then apologized for the delay, requested 
that she use the telephone to see if she could locate 
Mr. Huck. She came back and indicated she had not 
been successful . We then d iscussed briefLy, I think, 
in the waiting room, p r io r to her going out the door, 
and I indicated to her at that t ime that Mr . Hayes was 
very upset , that he had indicated that p r io r to her 
coming there that he considered them to be in default, 
or b reach of the agreement . 
We were giving them notice of that at that par t i cu la r 
t ime . She then indicated something about liens and 
encumbrances of record . I indicated to her that I 
knew nothing about l iens and encumbrances of r ecord 
as of that t ime , but if she des i red to go and look into 
the mat te r and de termine supposedly what it was ail 
about and come back and sit down and negotiate fur ther , 
p resent another offer, that we would be glad to do that . 
She at that t ime left. 
6. The Twenty-Second Finding of Fact was entered as folic 
It was then mutually agreed among ail pa r t i e s that the 
tax lien should be officially re leased and that a c o r r e c t 
balance of defendant 's equity in the proper ty should be 
obtained from the banks by recomputing the taxes and 
insurance from the previous seven y e a r s . Richard 
P e r k i n s , defendant 's a t torney, specifically stated that 
it would be impossible to close the t ransac t ion until 
these m a t t e r s were concluded. 
The Twenty-Third Finding of Fact was entered as follow 
It was then mutually agreed by all the pa r t i e s p resen t , 
including defendant and defendant 's a t torney, Richard 
P e r k i n s , that Marc ia Evans should secure a r e l ease of 
- 16 -
the tax lien and take any s teps n e c e s s a r y to obtain a 
co r r ec t ed balance sat isfactory to both Dr . Kirschbaum 
and defendant. 
Findings of Fact Twenty-Two and Twenty-Three a r e improper 
for the reasons that they include a conclusion of law, "It was then mutually 
agreed among all p a r t i e s " , and, fur ther , they a r e not supported by the 
evidence in that they imply that any agreement among the par t ies to c lear 
the tax lien upon the proper ty and to co r rec t the balance of the defendant 's 
equity was an agreement to c lose , pursuant to the t e r m s of the Earnes t 
Money Receipt and Offer to P u r c h a s e , which, by i ts very t e r m s , terminated 
on March 8, 1974. In fact, the Findings themse lves set forth and substan-
t iate the test imony of Mr . Pe rk ins (Lines 15-22^ Page 204, Transc r ip t of 
Proceedings) , that M r s . Evans was informed the ma t t e r could be renego-
tiated and, a l so , the Findings do provide that defendant 's equity is to be 
recomputed, taking into considerat ion the tax lien on the proper ty , as well 
a s adjustments due to computation of taxes and insurance from the previous 
seven y e a r s . 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the Defendant-Appellant that the Plaintiff 
did not per form in accordance with the Earnes t Money Receipt and Offer 
to Pu rchase (Exhibit 3 -P) , by discharging his d^ity to tender Defendant's 
equity on or before March 8, 1974. There fo re , Plaintiff is not entitled 
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to a judgment of specific pe r fo rmance , and the Defendant-Appellant 
respectfully urges the Court to r e v e r s e the decision of the t r i a l court 
by sett ing aside the judgment and remanding the case to the t r i a l court 
for entry of judgment of d i smi s sa l in accordance with the p raye r of the 
Defendant 's Verified Answer to Amended Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID H. SCHWOBE 
for TURNER & PERKINS 
Valley Profess ional Plaza 
2525 South Main, Suite 14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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